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data are often revised. Finally, monetary policy
cannot affect near-term conditions anyway. Thus,
a focus on medium- and long-term fundamentals
is always appropriate.
The causes of our current prosperity will be
studied by economists for some time. Today, I
wish to discuss one of those: our improved under-
standing of how price stability contributes to
overall economic stability. That understanding
is reflected in the Federal Reserve’s commitment
to maintaining a low, stable rate of inflation.
Efforts to improve communications and increase
the transparency of policymaking are essential
aspects of that commitment. The public must
understand not only the policy objectives but
also the Fed’s objectives and the decision-making
process through which it seeks to attain those
objectives—something that I have referred to for
many years as “synching” the Fed and financial
markets. This process is eased if policymakers
follow what macroeconomists refer to as “rule-
based” behavior, particularly rules focused on
price stability.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments. Richard G. Anderson, vice president in the
Research Division, provided special assistance.
However, I retain full responsibility for errors.
THE DUAL MANDATE
Under the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed has a
dual mandate to foster both maximum employ-
ment and price stability. I regard “price stability”
O
ur economy is fundamentally
sound. The GDP gap is small.
Putting aside near-term uncertain-
ties, mostly related to housing and
housing finance, economic activity is growing
at approximately the same rate as potential.
Although fourth quarter GDP growth is now
estimated to be a 2.5 percent pace, down from
the advance estimate of 3.5 percent, much of
this markdown was due to a downward revision
in inventory investment. Final sales of domestic
output—GDP minus the change in inventories—
grew at a robust 3.7 percent annual rate in the
fourth quarter and were 3.3 percent higher than
a year earlier. Unemployment in the fourth quar-
ter stood at 4.5 percent, as low as any point in the
current economic expansion. The employment
rate—the fraction of the non-institutional popu-
lation 16 and older with jobs—stood at 63.3 per-
cent, also its high point in the economic expan-
sion. Forecasters anticipate that these favorable
fundamental conditions will continue; they fore-
see the economy’s output during the next two
years remaining near potential, with a growth
rate averaging approximately 3 percent.
As always, my view on economic growth
and inflation emphasizes longer-run conditions.
I could point to numerous past episodes of either
faster or slower growth for a few quarters that we
now ignore because long-run developments domi-
nated the outcome and indeed dominate our cur-
rent assessment of these periods. In assessing
short-run developments, it is also essential to
keep in mind that forecasts have standard errors.
Over a four-quarter horizon, a GDP forecast has a
standard error of about 1.5 percentage points
and an inflation forecast has a standard error of
about 0.5 percentage points. We know also thatas zero inflation, properly measured. What does
“properly measured” mean? Price indexes have
biases of various sorts and experts generally
believe that U.S. indexes overstate inflation by a
modest amount. If statisticians understood these
biases with precision, the indexes could be cor-
rected. I myself make a rough guess that, for exam-
ple, the consumer price index overstates inflation
by about one percentage point a year.
With price stability, the average level of all
prices—correctly measured—would neither
increase nor decrease during the medium- and
long-run. Price stability in this sense does not
imply, however, that the prices of individual goods
and services will not change, nor does it imply
that a number of prices cannot change sharply
during over the short run, nor does it imply that
there cannot be large changes in relative prices.
If fossil fuels or metals become more expensive
relative to other goods and services, so be it—
stabilizing the relative prices of energy and metals
is not a responsibility or even within the power
of monetary policy. Differentials in productivity
growth among goods and services also may cause
sharp changes in the relative prices of some prod-
ucts—these are not the responsibility of monetary
policy either.
In recent years several FOMC members have
referred to a “comfort zone” of 1-2 percent infla-
tion measured by the price index for personal
consumption expenditures, excluding the volatile
food and energy components. Because agreement
on some reasonably low rate of inflation is more
important than exactly what that rate is, I am per-
fectly happy to state my personal inflation objec-
tive as an inflation rate measured by the core PCE
price index of 1.5 percent, plus or minus 0.5
percent.1
It used to be thought that the dual mandate
required the Fed to temper pursuit of its inflation
goal from time to time in the interest of minimiz-
ing disturbances to employment. That view began
to change 40 years ago. Over time, the mainstream
view in the economics profession has increasingly
emphasized the importance of price stability for
achieving maximum employment and maximum
sustainable economic growth. I myself have
become passionate about price stability. It is
important to remember that the two greatest
employment disasters in U.S. history were the
Great Depression and the Great Inflation. Defla-
tion from late 1929 to 1933 drove the U.S. econ-
omy down and down, and the unemployment
rate rose to 25 percent. During the Great Inflation,
from 1965 to 1981, the United States suffered four
recessions, the last of which in 1981-82 drove
the unemployment rate to a peak of 10.7 percent
at the end of 1982, the highest since the Great
Depression.
Experience abroad confirms the connection
between price instability and unemployment.
For one example, Japan suffered a decade of
deflation in the 1990s; economic growth was
minimal and unemployment rose.
SOLIDIFYING PRICE STABILITY
The central bank’s primary tool to maximize
employment and growth is price stability. The
central bank can refine its pursuit of price stability
in three important ways. First, the leadership of
a central bank should form a consensus around
the goal of a specific low inflation rate; the par-
ticular chosen number is less important than com-
mitment to a specific goal. Second, the central
bank must develop a consistent policy model, or
decision framework, for responding to incoming
data. The framework must explain how policy-
makersreconcilenear-termmovements in inflation,
over which monetary policy has almost no influ-
ence, with the path of medium- to long-term
inflation, for which the central bank is almost
wholly responsible. Constructing the policy
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1 I have discussed this range in several previous speeches. For a recent example, see W. Poole, “Inflation, Financial Stability, and Economic
Growth,” Global Interdependence Center Abroad in Chile Conference, Santiago, Chile, March 5, 2007 [http://www.stlouisfed.org/news/
speeches/2007/pdf/03_05.pdf]. Earlier examples include W. Poole, “The Monetary Policy Model,” Business Economics, October 2006, 41,
pp. 7-10, and W. Poole, “Inflation Targeting,” Junior Achievement of Arkansas Inc., February 16, 2006, published in the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis Review, May/June 2006, 88(3) pp. 155-163.model is far from a trivial task. And, third, the
central bank must communicate this framework
to the public in a credible and transparent way.
Over the past decade or so, the Fed has gravi-
tated to the position of placing primary empha-
sis on the core rate of inflation, as measured by
the PCE price index excluding food and energy.
The reason is that food and energy prices are
subject to large short-run disturbances that are
beyond the ability of monetary policy to control.
If we examine total and core price inflation over
three years, the averages are quite close. Food
and energy prices display substantial short-run
variability that does not affect longer-run inflation.
The basic, strategic goal is all-items or headline
inflation; core inflation is a tactical goal in the
short run.
However inflation is measured, economists
agree that monetary policy has at most a minimal
influence on the rate of change in the price level
over relatively short time periods—months,
quarters or perhaps even a year. Central banks
are responsible for medium- and long-term infla-
tion—such inflation, as Milton Friedman wrote,
is a monetary phenomenon that depends on past,
current and expected future monetary policy. As
a practical matter, the medium- to long-term
likely is a period of two to five years.
The phenomenon of modern inflation—a
sustained, broad-based increase in the economy’s
average price level—is one that depends on the
use of an inconvertible “fiat” money. Because
fiat money is not legally linked to specific quan-
tities of any metal or other commodity, it is
subject to indefinite expansion. Monetary policy-
makers are acutely aware of the linkages between
excessive money creation and inflation. Although
today central banks do not conduct policy by
targeting monetary aggregates, the classic linkage
between money and inflation persists. Figure 1
shows the correlation during three decades, for a
cross-section of approximately 70 countries as
available on the International Financial Statistics
database. Inflation is measured as the country’s
headline inflation measure, and money is meas-
ured as a broad money aggregate (the sum of the
variables labeled “money” and “quasi money”
in the database). The scales in all three panels
are the same. A regression line also is shown,
although it must be interpreted only as a descrip-
tive statistic because money and inflation are
endogenous, jointly determined variables. Gener-
ally, both the rates of inflation and money growth
have decreased over the three decades, and the
scatter of points has become somewhat tighter.
The U.S. inflation record is shown in the
table of the handout. The data are the implicit
price deflator for personal consumption expen-
ditures in the national income accounts; the PCE
chain-price index behaves similarly except fewer
historical observations are available. The table
shows decade-average mean inflation rates and
their standard deviations; the left-side columns
are annual averages, the right-side columns Q4-
to-Q4 changes. For most periods, the CPI also
behaves similarly, except in 1980 when rising
mortgage rates contributed to a large jump in the
CPI but are not included in the PCE index.
Figure 2 shows 10-year trailing moving aver-
ages, in the spirit of a backward-looking adaptive
expectations model. The figure shows the extent
to which monetary policymakers failed citizens
of the United States during the 1970s, a decade
when both the level of inflation and its variance
approximately tripled. Today, both the level and
variance of inflation have returned to their values
of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
The challenge for policymakers is to be certain
that the recent behavior of inflation persists. To
explain what we know about how to do that, I
next discuss the period of the Great Inflation of
the 1970s and what lessons it taught us.
THE GREAT INFLATION AND
REFORM OF OCTOBER 1979
Understanding inflation in the U.S. economy
cannot omit discussion of the Great Inflation that
ended with the policy reform of October 1979—
the premier event in U.S. inflation history. During
the 1970s, consumer price inflation (measured
by the price deflator for personal consumption
expenditures) averaged 61/2 percent, approxi-
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Figure 1.—Average Inflation and Growth Rate of Money across Countries
1975 to 1985
































































































Average Inflation and Growth Rate of Money Across Countries, 1975 to 1985
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund/Haver.mately double the historical average since 1930
and triple the average of the prior two decades.
Inflation wasn’t steady over the decade either—
the year-to-year variance was triple that of the
previous two decades and there were two periods
of double-digit inflation, more than 11 percent
during 1974 and more than 10 percent from
1978-80, measured by the PCE deflator.
The 1970s illustrate the importance of a well-
thought-out commitment to price stability as a
bulwark against large shocks to individual com-
modities—that is, large relative price changes—
feeding through into more general inflation. In a
1982 paper, Alan Blinder sought to quantify this
process. First, he measured the baseline inflation
rate, the medium- to long-term trend inflation due
to monetary policy. In the early 1960s, it was near
1 to 2 percent, in the early 1970s near 4 to 5 per-
cent, and in 1980 near 9 to 10 percent. Although
he doesn’t mention it, the University of Michigan’s
survey of inflation expectations began in January
1978. At its inception, the median expected rate
was 5 percent; two years later, it was 10 percent.
Clearly, monetary policy had become unhinged
from price stability during this period. But what
was the role of relative prices?
The energy shock of 1973-74 was the largest
shock of its type, up to that time. Energy prices
increased approximately 25 percent in 1974,
boosting near-term inflation to a pace more than
twice the estimated baseline, or trend, rate. Infla-
tion slowed quickly in 1975, however, as energy
prices steadied, with headline inflation at approxi-
mately a 5 percent pace in the second quarter of
1975 and as low as 3 percent in 1976’s second
quarter. Thereafter, however, inflation rebounded
to a relatively stable baseline pace of approxi-
mately 51/2 to 61/2 percent.
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Figure 2.—U.S. Personal Consumption Expenditures: Implicit Price Deflator













U.S. Personal Consumption Expenditures: Implicit Price Deflator
10-Year Moving Averages of Annual Data
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis/Haver.Inflation rose sharply once again during
1977-1980. Blinder estimates that the baseline
rate reached 81/2 percent in 1979 and 10 percent
in 1980. The Michigan survey hit 10 percent in
November 1979 and remained at that level until
May 1980—when the combination of tighter
monetary policy and the credit controls, author-
ized by President Carter on March 14, sharply
slowed second-quarter economic activity. Relative-
price changes affecting food, energy and mortgage
interest rates pushed headline CPI inflation far
above the baseline pace—at that time, the CPI
included mortgage rates. CPI inflation moved
above 101/2 percent in January 1979, and exceeded
12 percent in nine of the year’s 12 months; the
annual average, December to December, was 131/4
percent. But 1980 was worse, as the CPI rose at a
14.6 percent pace during the year’s first half. Not
until March 1981 did the inflation rate slip con-
sistently below 10 percent. The behavior of energy
prices, measured as the energy price component
of the CPI, was extraordinary. Energy prices
increased 37 percent during 1979 on a fourth
quarter-to-fourth quarter basis, increased during
1980’s first quarter at a 41 percent annual rate,
and increased during 1981’s first quarter at a 28
percent pace, before stabilizing after March 1981.
The inflation of the 1970s was a combination
of large, rapid changes in relative prices for food
and energy overlaid on top of a rising underlying
inflation trend. Economists have long debated
the direction of causation: Did the increasing trend
in inflation cause the relative price changes—for
example, as oil producers sought to offset falling
real prices—or did the shocks to relative prices
tend to push upward the trend? And, did FOMC
actions worsen the situation by seeking to sustain
the pace of economic activity? Blinder concludes
that the “behavior of money supply tells us almost
nothing about the bursts of double digit inflation
in 1974 and 1979-80.” Perhaps this claim is true.
But, why did the medium- and long-term baseline
inflation rate, primarily due to monetary policy,
continue to increase during the 1970s? Why didn’t
the prices of other goods decrease significantly
as energy prices increased?
I have elsewhere recently discussed some of
these issues; so, let me be brief.2 There is no rea-
son, logically, why changes in relative prices—
even large changes—should pass through
MONETARY POLICY AND INFLATION
6
2 W. Poole, “Inflation, Financial Stability, and Economic Growth,” presented at Global Interdependence Center (GIC) Abroad in Chile
Conference, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile, March 5, 2007.
Table 1
U.S. Inflation Rates by Decade
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Explicit Price Deflator
Annual average percent change Annual Q4/Q4 percent change
Dates Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
1930-1939 –2.21 5.65
1940-1949 6.05 4.03
1950-1959 2.19 1.78 2.31 1.59
1960-1969 2.15 1.23 2.26 1.41
1970-1979 6.44 2.19 6.64 2.55
1980-1989 5.07 2.64 4.82 2.46
1990-1999 2.41 1.06 2.37 1.16
2000-2006 2.32 0.52 2.25 0.59
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis/Haver.automatically into headline inflation. Shouldn’t
the rate of increase of some other prices slow or,
perhaps, some prices even fall as the relative
price changes alter nominal demand? I have sug-
gested, as have various research studies, that the
reason such changes did not occur during the
Great Inflation was that the FOMC lacked a clear,
forward-looking framework for monetary policy-
making containing a commitment to price stability.
Without it, the Committee reacted to events as
they happened; that is, its behavior consisted of
a series of individual policy actions that did not
add up to define a coherent policy regime. Critics
have argued that superior policy would have
occurred if the Committee had operated accord-
ing to a regime, in which the policy instrument is
a rule for the conduct of policy. The essential dif-
ference is the extent to which the markets and
the public understand that (1) policy is forward
looking, according to a rule or strategy, and (2)
can therefore infer the future course of policy.
The predominant school of thought during
the 1960s and 1970s taught that inflation pos-
sessed an inherent momentum. Generally, it was
argued that consumers and businesses formed
their inflation expectations in an adaptive, auto-
regressive manner—essentially, a long distributed
lagwithfixedcoefficients.Academicefforts tended
to focus on whether the length of the distributed
lag was invariant to the rate of inflation—some
evidence suggested a shorter lag at higher infla-
tion rates or during a period of more variable
inflation—and whether the coefficients summed
to unity or not.
These approaches never examined whether
the fixed-coefficient model was correct in the
first place. Although the distributed lag gave the
inflation process persistence, current-period
actual inflation, it was argued, depended only
weakly on the unemployment rate—high unem-
ployment tempered wage increases which, after
subtracting productivity gains, were the primary
determinant of changes in the baseline inflation
rate. Superimposed on this framework was the
concept of a long-run “equilibrium” unemploy-
ment rate, which we will call “U*.” Proponents
acknowledged that U* could never be measured
precisely from aggregate data because of shifting
demographics and for other reasons. More recent
econometric studies suggest that U* cannot be
estimated accurately in almost any case—even
the best estimates have standard errors of 2 per-
centage points of unemployment or more.3
Finally, some proponents—and many critics of
this view—noted that the underlying inflation-
unemployment tradeoff, commonly referred to
as the Phillips curve, tended to shift for a large
number of reasons, including changing expecta-
tions of future inflation and supply shocks.
This framework predicted a very high cost to
reduce inflation: a typical estimate was that each
1 percentage point reduction in the baseline infla-
tion rate would cost approximately 1 percent of
annual GDP. Many analysts concluded that, in
present value terms, the cost over the infinite
future of steady inflation at the baseline rate was
less than the near-term disinflation cost measured
in foregone output.
The flaws in this model are now well-known.
Last year in my NABE lecture I outlined the cur-
rent state of macroeconomic theory for monetary
policy.4 The emphasis today is on forward-
looking behavior. The introduction of model-
consistent, or “rational,” expectations into
macroeconomics during the 1970s emphasized a
simple but essential idea: consumers and busi-
nesses in the economy understand the dynamic
economy in which they live. This theory does
not deny the persistence in inflation—the per-
sistence is real, not an illusion. But the cause of
the persistence is not an inherent momentum
unique to the social psychology of inflation. If
the central bank is perceived as being prepared
to acquiesce in higher inflation and unprepared
to pursue policies consistent with lower inflation,
then both inflation expectations and actual infla-
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3 Staigher, Stock and Watson (1997)
4 W. Poole, “The Monetary Policy Model,” Business Economics, October 2006, 41, pp. 7-10.tion will rise. And the reverse is also true: If the
central bank is perceived as unwilling to under-
write higher inflation and prepared to pursue
policies consistent with lower inflation, then
expectations and actual inflation will fall.
This line of thought has profoundly altered
our understanding of inflation and monetary
policymaking. When expectations are assumed
to be formed in a sluggish autoregressive manner,
it is natural to view policymaking as a series of
individual actions—determined meeting-by-
meeting and based heavily on the incoming data.
In such a framework, it also is natural to view
the FOMC as having a single policy instrument—
the overnight federal funds rate. Policy conducted
in this fashion leaves ill-defined the decision
structure governing future policy, and makes it
difficult, and perhaps impossible, to communi-
cate clearly to the public the longer-term objec-
tives and strategy of policy. Policymakers may
lack credibility, and their actions may lack
transparency.
The rational expectations literature makes
clear that policy regimes are the correct way to
interpret policy. Tom Sargent has defined a
regime as “a function or rule for repeatedly
selecting settings for economic policy variables
as a function of the state of the economy.”
5 Others
have labeled this “rule-like behavior.” A policy
regime, in some cases, might be as simple as a
single equation; an example is the Taylor Rule,
which I and many others have discussed else-
where. In this case, the policy rule, rather than
federal funds rate, is the instrument of monetary
policy—the federal funds target is an endoge-
nous variable within the larger model. The pre-
cise form of the rule, so long as it is consistent
with price stability, is less important than policy-
makers displaying rule-like behavior. The “rule”
certainly need not be a simple linear equation.
Rather, the rule is a method of decision-making
and a commitment to a specific, articulated
objective. Nobel laureate Robert Lucas (1981)
credits the introduction of this concept to Milton
Friedman in his 1948 A Monetary and Fiscal
Framework for Economic Stability.6 In the same
article, Lucas notes that Friedman’s maxim was
lost to policymakers during the two decades of
prosperity that followed the 1948 Employment
Act, setting the stage for the Great Inflation.
Actual policymaking, of course, requires
large doses of experience and judgment—former
Chairman Alan Greenspan argued that model
uncertainty counseled caution in policymaking.
Models omit many real-world problems such as
incomplete and asymmetric information, the
high cost of information and the value to both
workers and firms of multi-period contracts.
Nevertheless, the essential insight of rational
expectations survives—a sound policy rule or
regime is essential for a good outcome.
Some analysts have argued against rules for
monetary policymaking, viewing them as strait-
jackets for policy. If policymakers adopt a model,
how do they respond when the economy changes
significantly? Modern models clarify that the
benefits of “rule-like” behavior accrue even if
the central bank from time to time changes its
policy regime or rule.7 What is required is that at
each instance when policymakers decide to take
an action that is not consistent with their extant
rule, the new action must be consistent with some
policy rule that, in the medium- to long-term, will
achieve the stated policy objective. Surely it can-
not be the case that an optimal policy response to
a new set of circumstances could be determined
by consulting a table of random numbers.
When policy departs from usual practice, it
is incumbent that policymakers communicate
the change—its nature and rationale—carefully
to the public. Monetary policy is more powerful,
and better able to achieve its goals, if the forward-
looking behavior of consumers and businesses is
consistent with the forward-looking behavior
5 Sargent (1986). See also Sargent (1982) and Sargent (1999).
6 Friedman made similar arguments in his 1968 presidential address to the American Economic Association. Poole (1986) analyzes the ways
that political pressures push policymakers away from rule-like behavior and toward acting event-by-event to offset the problem of the moment.
7 Woodford (2003).
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years, I have referred to this as “synching” the
markets and monetary policy. The fundamental
mechanism for making synching work is com-
municating the policy regime or rule—but rule-
like behavior must be adopted by policymakers
in the first place before it can be communicated
to the public.
During the latter 1970s, the FOMC’s minutes,
transcripts and public statements suggest frus-
tration with an economy in which inflation
increased with ease but decreased reluctantly;
the Committee’s response was the monetary policy
reform of October 1979. Two years ago, we held
a special conference at the St. Louis Fed, on the
occasion of the 25th anniversary of reform, to
reflect on that monetary policy change. The papers
from the conference are available in a special issue
of our Review. In the conference opening remarks,
Chairman Alan Greenspan noted that by 1979 the
inflation situation had deteriorated to such an
extent that “if the Fed had not opted to initiate a
sharp interest rate increase in this country, the
market would have done it for us.” Heemphasizes
that the 1970s inflation experience reinforces the
role of price stability as a prerequisite for the
efficient allocation of resources in the economy
and for fulfilling the Fed’s goal of promoting
maximum sustainable economic growth.
Allan Meltzer, in his paper for the conference,
considered a wide variety of explanations, includ-
ing political business cycles, dynamic inconsis-
tency in policymaking, and the use of incorrect
economic theories and data. He concludes that
the policy failure was so large that no single the-
ory can account for it—multiple, mutually rein-
forcing failures are required. Among these was
the failure of FOMC members to distinguish
between the corrosive effects of more rapid infla-
tion as a cause of slower economic activity,
because inflation increased uncertainty, and
their fear that seeking to reduce inflation would,
itself, further slow economic activity. Today, we
appreciate that slowing inflation in the absence
of a clearly defined and well-articulated policy
regime will be costly—the concerns of these
Committee members were well-founded. We
also understand, however, that a clear policy
regime focused on price stability can sharply
reduce, if not eliminate, the likelihood of finding
ourselves in such a situation.8
CONCLUSIONS
For the United States, the last four decades
may be viewed as one “long cycle” in inflation.
That experience, plus developments in economic
theory, have permanently altered our understand-
ing of inflation. The cycle began as inflation
increased during the mid-1960s with the FOMC’s
accommodation of Vietnam-era deficit spending,
and reached full stride during the 1970s as mon-
etary policy hesitated to slow inflation during
episodes of major changes in relative prices. The
cycle peaked and changed direction with the
October 1979 regime shift in monetary policy,
brought about by Chairman Paul Volcker’s keen
understanding of what was at stake and skill in
changing policy direction. The disinflation of
the last 25 years has restored, today, both the
low level and low volatility of inflation that we
enjoyed prior to the Great Inflation. The disinfla-
tion has brought to us an era of price stability in
which recent energy price shocks have had but
modest near-term effects on inflation. Price sta-
bility has contributed to a resurgence of produc-
tivity growth by creating an environment in which
innovations in information and communication
technology may be confidently deployed through
increased capital investment. The duration and
amplitude of business cycle slowdowns also has
diminished, a change that Chairman Bernanke
has labeled the “Great Moderation.”
What longer-term lessons has the decade
brought to our understanding of how monetary
policy affects inflation? The most important les-
son is that policymakers must regard consumers
and businesses as understanding the dynamic
nature of the economy—and the impacts of policy
Understanding Inflation
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8 A number of papers have studied the October 1979 policy shift as a policy regime change. For a recent example, see Cecchetti, et al. (2007).on the economy—as well as they do. This lesson
tells us to focus on monetary policy regimes and
policy rules as the instrument of policy, not the
near-term choice of the federal funds rate target.
By doing so, the Committee’s actions affect the
expected future path of interest rates and anchor
inflation expectations. If the Committee commu-
nicates its objectives and strategy in a transpar-
ent and credible fashion, the bond market and
other forward-looking financial markets will
amplify the Committee’s near-term decisions
and thereby do a good deal of its work for it.
As always in an important line of research,
understanding remains incomplete. In particular,
we need to focus effort on improving the policy
rule—the regularity of policy actions that stabi-
lize the economy and make planning in the mar-
kets possible. But we should not sell short the
enormous advances already in place.
Thank you and I’d be delighted to take your
questions.
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